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Defensive Warfare, Prevention and Hegemony. The 
Justifications for the Franco-Spanish War of 1635 
(Part I)
Randall Lesaffer* 
In grateful memory to Hildegard Penn
I. Saturday, May 19, 1635
On Saturday May 19, 1635, at around 9 o’clock a.m., Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas, herald 
of France under the name of Alençon, carrying the insignia of his office, had himself 
announced by his trumpeter, Gratien Elissavide, before the Hallegate of Brussels in the 
Spanish Netherlands (roughly present-day Belgium).1 His assignment was as serious as 
it was to prove tedious. The King of France, Louis �III (1610-1643), had issued orders 
for him to go to the Spanish Netherlands and present himself to Don Fernando of Spain 
(1609-1641), commonly known as the Cardinal-Infante, who ruled the Spanish Neth-
erlands for his brother King Philip IV of Spain (1621-1665), and to declare war upon 
Spain. In case the Cardinal-Infante, who had received an ultimatum from the French 
King earlier2 and could not be mistaken about the reasons for the visit, refused to see 
the herald, Gratiollet was instructed to present the declaration to one of the courtiers 
of Don Fernando. If that did not work either, Gratiollet was instructed, as a last resort, 
to nail the declaration to a border post before reentering France.3
This contingency plan would not prove superfluous. Some days later, in their report 
to the King, Gratiollet and Elissavide recounted their misadventures that day in Brussels. 
After the first commotion had subsided, the sergeant-major in charge of the Hallegate, 
together with the first king of arms of the Spanish Netherlands under the name of “Toison 
d’Or”, came out and invited the French herald into the town, relaying the promise that 
* I thank Professor Peter Haggenmacher (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), 
Dr. Anuschka Ticher (Marburg) and Ignacio Rodriguez Alvarez (Intervict, Tilburg) for their 
useful comments. 
1 On Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas, see C.L. d’Aubas de Gratiollet, Notes sur la famille d’Aubas de 
Gratiollet 3-6 (1854).
2 By the representative of the French King in Brussels, Gabriel d’Amontot, by order of the King                
of April 21, 1635. Denis-Louis-Martial Avenel,  Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers 
d’état du Cardinal de Richelieu vol. 4, 762 (Collection des documents inédits sur l’histoire de 
France No. 55, 1861). For the reply of the Cardinal-Infante, see Letter of Richard-Pauli Stravius           
to Francesco Barberini of May 5, 1635, in Correspondance de Richard-Pauli Stravius (1634-
1642) 63 (Wilfrid Brulez ed., Analecta Vaticano-Belgica No. 2.10, 1955).
3 Issued on May 12, 1635 at Saint-Quentin; published in Avenel, supra note 2, vol. 4, 760.
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the Cardinal-Infante would grant him an audience. Thereby, under the customs and rules 
of chivalry and heraldry, his immunity as a herald was assured.4 The sergeant-major and 
the king of arms requested Gratiollet to lay down the symbols of his office, which he 
refused fearing this to be a ruse aimed at invalidating his future actions. Gratiollet was 
taken to the house of the sergeant-major at the Place de Sablon, where reassurance was 
given once again that the Cardinal-Infante would receive the herald later that day.5 At 
2 o’clock p.m., the officer returned only to offer new excuses for more delay. During 
the day, several more officials came to see the French herald, among whom two other 
heralds from the Netherlands.6 Finally, between 6 and 7 o’clock p.m., Gratiollet offered 
the document of the declaration of war to one of the gentlemen of the Cardinal-Infante, 
who upon seeing it took flight. Gratiollet then left the house at the Sablon accompanied 
by two of the Cardinal-Infante’s heralds. After having mounted his horse, he threw the 
declaration of war on the ground among the angry crowd, while the heralds cried not 
to touch the paper. Gratiollet and Elissavide then batted their retreat and rode back to 
France. When they reached the border in the morning of Monday May 21, the French 
herald attached two copies of the declaration to a post and informed the mayor of the 
nearby village thereof.7 The declaration read:
“The herald of arms of France under the title of Alençon lets it be known to all con-
cerned that he came to the Netherlands to find there the Cardinal-Infante of Spain 
on behalf of his master the King, his sole and sovereign Lord, to state that, as he 
[the Cardinal-Infante] has refused to restore the Archbishop of Trier, Elector of the 
Empire, to liberty, who has been placed under the King’s protection in the impos-
sibility of the Emperor or any other prince to bestow their protection onto him, and 
as he holds a sovereign prince prisoner who was not at war with him, against the 
dignity of the Empire and against the law of nations, His Majesty declares that he 
will get redress for this offense through the use of arms, as this is an offense against 
the interests of all princes of Christianity.”8
4 P. Adam Even, “Les fonctions militaires des hérauts d’armes”, 71 Archives héraldiques suisses 
2 (1957).
5 In reality, the Cardinal-Infante left Brussels after he had heard of the herald’s arrival and 
traveled to Leuven to prepare for the coming campaign; Letter of the Cardinal-Infante to Olivares 
of May 23, 1635: Brussels, General Royal Archive, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 334, 
239; Michel Huisman, Jean Dhondt, and Lucienne Van Meerbeeck eds., Les Relations militaires 
des années 1634 et 1635, rédigées par Jean-Antoine Vincart, Secrétaire des avis sécrets de guerre 
au Pays-Bas 124 (1958).
6 The heralds of Hainaut and Gueldres.
7 Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas, “Procez verbal du héraut envoyé par le Roy au Cardinal-Infante 
lui dénoncer la guerre”, 72 Gazette de France 285 (1635); Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas and Gratien 
Elissavide, “Relation au roi”, in Notes sur la famille d’Aubas de Gratiollet 14-18. See also Luc 
Duerlo, “1635 : Hoe een oorlog begon”, in Tienen 1635: Geschiedenis van een Brabantse stad 
in de zeventiende eeuw 111-113 (1985).
8 “Sommation envoyée de la part du Roy par un Héraut au Cardinal-Infante”,            67 Gazette de 
France 272 (1635); Gratiollet, supra note 7, at 288; D’Aubas and Elissavide, supra note 7, at 17 
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By the time Gratiollet had succeeded in delivering his message, the hostilities between 
the French and Spanish armies had begun. Even before Gratiollet and his trumpeter 
first entered the Spanish Netherlands, a French army of 26,000 men had crossed into 
the Duchy of Luxemburg, one of the Spanish fiefs in the Netherlands.9 On Sunday May 
20, they met with a small Spanish corps under Prince Thomas of Savoy (1596-1656) 
near Les Avins and crushed it.10 Thus the war, that would last for almost a quarter of a 
century (up to 1659) and change the balance of power in Europe, started before it had 
been declared officially.
The medieval-style declaration of war to the Cardinal-Infante by herald was one 
of the last of its kind.11 By 1635, declaration by herald had fallen into disuse. As the 
sixteenth century moved on, wars were increasingly declared through an ambassador 
and announced to the world through the publication of manifestos.12 More and more 
wars were not declared in any formal way.13
The French declaration of May 19, 1635 served three purposes. First, France wanted 
to reassure its allies that France had finally broken with Spain. Second, by declaring war 
on Spain only, the French refrained from breaking with Spain’s main ally, the Habsburg 
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Third, by addressing the declaration not the Span-
ish King himself but to his representative in the Netherlands, France left the door ajar 
later to deny that it had declared war on Philip IV and Spain. Apart from the desire to 
prove chivalrous and the nice reminiscences it made to the days of the wars between 
the Emperor Charles V (1519-1558) and the French King Francis I (1515-1547), the 
desire to draw attention to this threefold message offers at least part of the explanation 
for the return to bygone formalities.
But France was not to retrace its steps and deny being at war with Spain. In the 
weeks following Gratiollet’s visit to Brussels, further steps were taken to make the 
state of war official. On June 6, 1635, Louis XIII issued a lengthy Declaration du Roy, 
(my transl.). A copy of the declaration can be found in Brussels,          General Royal Archive, Papiers 
de l’Etat et de l’Audience No. 212.
9 Letter of Hugo Grotius to the Rhinegrave Otto of May 17, 1635, in Briefwisseling van Hugo 
Grotius vol. 5 at 487-489 (B.L. Meulenbroek ed., 1966).
10 Relation de ce qui s’est passé en bataille gagnée par l’armée du roi contre celle d’Espagne, 
commandée par le prince Thomas (1635).
11 The last one was the Swedish declaration against Denmark in 1657; Ernest Nys, Le droit 
de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius 111-112 (1882); Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations 
Considered as Independent Political Communities vol. 2, 59 (1863); Voltaire’s claim that the 
1635 declaration was the last of its kind remains, however, widely accepted in literature. Voltaire, 
“Le Siècle de Louis �IV” in Œuvres Historiques 632 (René Pomeau ed., 1957).
12 Anuschka Tischer, “Der Wandel politischer Kommunikation im Kriegsfall: Formen, Inhalte 
und Funktionen von Kriegsbegründungen der Kaiser Maximilian I. und Karl V”, 9 Militär und 
Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit 7 (2005).
13 Andreas Steinlein, Die Form der Kriegserklärung. Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung 31-
3 (1917); Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis Iuris Gentium 17.50 (John Pawley Bate transl., 
Carnegie 1916) (1680).
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announcing the state of war and offering abundant justification for it. It was duly reg-
istered by the Parliament of Paris on June 18 and subsequently published, on June 20, 
in the Gazette de France.14 Early July, another text explaining the reasons for the war 
was released.15 While the first text was first and foremost, if not exclusively,16 directed 
at the King’s officials throughout the realm in order to inform them of the state of war 
and the measures against Spanish subjects and their property that went along with it, the 
second text was a manifesto addressed to the public at large. Although it was primarily 
aimed at a French audience, its readers could also include foreigners.17
On June 24, 1635, the Cardinal-Infante retaliated by having his own declaration 
issued.18 In it, he offered his arguments for the justice of the Spanish cause. At the end 
of the text, the Cardinal-Infante, in the name of his brother, formally declared war upon 
France and listed the measures taken against French subjects and their property. As the 
French and their ally, the Dutch Republic, had incited the population of the Spanish 
Netherlands to revolt against the Spanish upon their joint invasion, the Cardinal-In-
fante’s declaration was primarily targeted at the citizens of the Spanish Netherlands.19 
Moreover, the Cardinal-Infante’s declaration was spread throughout the Spanish empire, 
14 Declaration du Roy sur l’ouverture de la guerre contre le Roy d’Espagne (1635). Also pub-
lished in 85 Gazette de France 335 (1635). 
15 Manifeste du Roy Contentant les justes causes que Sa Majesté a euës de declarer la guerre au 
Roy d’Espagne (1635). It was published by Ribot (Paris), Roussin (Lyon), and Cramoisy (Paris).           
Also published in 20 Mercure Français 949 (1635). There are several translations in Spanish, 
e.g. Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 2366, 204, Ms. 18192, 191, Ms. 10.713, and Ms. 18.195, 
51, and in Italian, Ms. 11.000, 19 and Ms. 8.247. A transcription from Ms. 2366 was published 
in José Maria Jover, 1635. Historia de una polemica y semblanza de una generacion         vol. 2, 
469 (1949). The French King sent the text to one of his officials on June 9, 1635: Lettre du Roy 
escrite à Monseigneur le Duc de Monbazon, Pair & grand Veneur de France, Gouverneur & 
Lieutenant general pour le Roy, de Paris & Isle de France. Contenant les justes causes que sa 
Majesté a eües de declarer la guerre au Roy d’Espagne (1635), also published in Jean Du Mont, 
Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens vol. 6-1, 105 (1726). There was also a Dutch 
translation published in 1635: Manifeste en verklaringe des konings van Vranckrijck, geschreven 
aen den hertoghe van Mont-Bazon … (1635).
16 It certainly helped convince Hugo Grotius, then ambassador of the Swedish Queen in Paris, that 
the French were serious about their rupture with Spain. He wrote: “Het manifest bij den coninck 
wtgegeven ende het parlement geverifieert houde ik voor een volcommon rupture, soo veel die 
met woorden kan werden gedaen” [The manifesto issued by the king and verified in Parliament 
constitutes, in my view, a perfect rupture, as far as this can be done by mere words] (my transl.); 
Letter of July 2, 1635 to Nicholas Reigersberch, supra note 9, vol. 6, 62-63 (1967).
17 Hermann Weber, “Zur Legitimation der französischen Kriegserklärung von 1635”, 108 His-
torisches Jahrbuch 90, 104 (1988).
18 Declaration de son Alteze touchant la guerre contre la couronne de France (1635). Published 
in the Plakkaten van Brabant on 24 June 1635, see Het tweede deel van de placcaeten ende 
ordonnantien vande hertoghen van Brabandt princen van dese Nederlanden 354-356 (1635).
19 A Dutch translation was soon made: Verklaringhe van Sijne Hoogheydt aangaende den Oor-
loghe teghen de Kroone van Vranckryck (1635).
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at least in official circles.20 In Madrid, Olivares had an extensive justification prepared 
to be issued by Philip IV. It dates, at the earliest, from the end of July 1635.21 It was, 
however, never published.
II. Declarations of War and the Applicable Law of Nations
Whereas a declaration of war by herald had become extremely rare by the early sev-
enteenth century and was hardly repeated after 1635, the official issuing of lengthy 
public declarations and manifestos offering justifications for the war was anything but 
rare. During the Early-Modern Age, almost all important wars were accompanied by a 
stream of such manifestos.22 Also, many scholarly treatises and manifestos, written by 
private persons, saw the light of day. Many of the authors of such treatises had close 
connections with their governments. This was certainly the case in 1635. In France, 
Spain and the Spanish Netherlands, several authors sat down at their desks to defend 
their sovereign’s cause and refute the enemy’s claims.23
In this article, the legal justifications of the Franco-Spanish war of 1635 offered by 
the French and Spanish governments are analyzed. The discussion is limited to the four 
official declarations and manifestos mentioned above: the two French, the one issued 
by the Cardinal-Infante and the one prepared for Philip IV.
It cannot be the primary and sole purpose of analyzing these official statements to 
reach a verdict on the justice or legality of the two belligerents’ positions in terms of the 
then existing ius ad bellum, a term used here to denote the body of law that regulates the 
right to wage war. Rather, it is to try to establish what the law of nations said about the 
ius ad bellum at the time. After all, it is not so clear what the law of nations in general 
20 There were Spanish and Italian versions: Declaración de su alteza … del se�or … Cardenal-   
Infante acerca de la guerre contra la Corona de Francia: Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 
3-16.627 and 1.635. A Spanish version was also published by Martin Goblet from Madrid as            
Declaración de su Alteza el serenissimo Infante Cardenal tocante à la guerra contra la Corona 
de Francia (1635). See also Jover, supra note 15, vol. 1, 257-258.
21 Declaracion de don Felipe Cuarto, Rey de las Espa�as, al rompimiento de la guerra que 
sin denunciarla ha hecho Luys, Rey de Francia: Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 290, 103-
141, partly published in Jover, supra note 15, vol. 2, 505-511. In 1636, Emperor Ferdinand II 
(1619-1637) declared war on France too and followed it up by a manifesto as well. This is not 
considered in this article. It is published in Victorine Hartmann,      Les Papiers de Richelieu, Section 
Politique Extérieure, Correspondance et Papiers d’Etat, Empire Allemand vol. 3, 9 (1999).
22 Konrad Repgen, “Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa. Entwurf einer historischen Typologie”,         
241 Historische Zeitschrift 27, 32 (1985). Anuschka Tischer (Marburg) is currently working on         
early-modern war declarations as a source for diplomatic history; see Anuschka Tischer, “Offi-
zielle Kriegsbegründungen in der frühen Neuzeit – Funktionen, Formen, Inhalte”, 8 Militär und 
Gesellschaft in der frühen Neuzeit 48 (2004).
23 For a survey and discussion of these private manifestos and treatises, see Jover,             supra note 
15, and “Tienen in de eindfase van de Tachtigjarige oorlog 1621-1648”, in Tienen 1635: Ge-
schiedenis van een Brabantse stad in de zeventiende eeuw 13, notes 97-99 (1985). Seven Spanish  
manifestos can be found in Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 2366.
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and the ius ad bellum in particular were in the early seventeenth century. Only when 
we have a clearer view on the ius ad bellum as it stood, we can reach a verdict on the 
rights and wrongs of the parties involved.
First, no codification of the relevant rules existed in whatever form. Second, the law 
of nations was in full transition. Since the early sixteenth century, Christian Europe had 
been in deep turmoil. The Reformation had shaken the very foundations of the medieval 
legal order of the Latin West, the respublica christiana. The religious wars between 
Catholic and Protestant powers, the internal strives in several countries such as the 
Holy Roman Empire and France, and the struggle for hegemony over Europe between 
the French kings and the Habsburg rulers of Spain and the Empire had aggravated the 
crisis. The Age of Discoveries had opened up new worlds to the Latin-Christian West 
that were neither Latin nor Christian. This challenged the old political and juridical 
conceptions about the world and international relations. All this had caused the old 
legal order of the Latin West to crumble. And with it went the old law of nations, the 
medieval ius gentium. 
Between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, many scholastic thinkers – theolo-
gians, Roman lawyers as well as canon lawyers – addressed questions relating to the law 
of nations (ius gentium). The medieval ius gentium was not an autonomous discipline; 
it was an inextricable part of theology and of the ius commune. The ius commune was 
the late-medieval legal doctrine that was common to the whole Latin West and that 
was based on the study and interpretation of Roman and canon law. The scholastic 
theologians, and civil and canon lawyers also elaborated on the right to wage war. One 
of the products of their endeavors, especially of the theologians, was the doctrine of 
the just war.24 Founded upon authoritative texts such as the Bible, the Church Fathers, 
the Digest of Justinian, and the medieval collections of canon law, the ideas of the 
medieval theologians and lawyers on the ius gentium and on the right to wage war had 
authoritative value. And while there may have been as many opinions about a problem 
of the ius gentium as there were minds turned to it, a kind of simplified and vulgar 
communis opinio emerged that gained wide acceptance. At least those rules of the ius 
gentium that had a foothold in canon law could be upheld by the ecclesiastical courts, 
in particular by the highest of those, the papal court. The Christian faith, the canon 
law, and the authority of the Church formed the common basis for the ius gentium as 
a binding and enforceable law.25 
24 On the various contributions of theologians, and canon and civil lawyers to the question of the 
right to wage war, see Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (1983).
25 On the significance of canon law for the medieval ius gentium, see Dominique Bauer, “The 
Importance of Medieval Canon Law and the Scholastic Tradition for the Emergence of the Early 
Modern International Legal Order”, in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: 
From the Late Middle Ages to World War One 198 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004); Randall Lesaffer, 
“The Medieval Canon Law of Contract and Early Modern Treaty Law”, 2 Journal of the History 
of International Law 178 (2000); idem, “Argument from Roman Law in Current International 
Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription”, 16 European J. Int’l L. 25, 34-37 (2005); James 
Muldoon, “The Contribution of the Medieval Canon Lawyers to the Formation of International 
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The Reformation and the turmoil of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
changed all that. Religion, which had been a measure of unity, now became a measure 
of disruption. The canon law and the ecclesiastical courts lost their authority in the 
Protestant parts of Europe. As a consequence, their usefulness for the relations between 
Catholic powers gradually eroded too. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the 
Pope and the ecclesiastical courts all but ceased to be appealed to as guarantors of 
peace treaties, something which had been a common practice before. As the canon law 
had formed the backbone of the authoritative doctrines pertaining to the ius gentium, 
these doctrines lost the strongest foundation of their authority. This does not imply that 
the old doctrines, such as the just war doctrine, were all of a sudden rejected. To the 
contrary, many writers, theologians as well as Roman lawyers, tried to save what they 
could, but opinions started to differ and new ideas took shape.26 By the early seven-
teenth century, many writers from different religions and intellectual backgrounds had 
amended the just war doctrine to allow the sovereign princes and republics of Europe 
more freedom of action.
The crisis of the Latin West and the Church’s loss of authority had made the sovereign 
princes and republics of Europe all of sudden truly external sovereigns, in the sense 
that they were free from any – even theoretical – higher authority in secular affairs. 
The medieval order of the respublica christiana, where all political entities stood in 
a hierarchical relation to one another and all had to recognize the ultimate if highly 
theoretical legal and political authority of the Emperor (until the thirteenth century), 
the Pope (until the sixteenth century), and their respective laws (Roman and canon 
law), had collapsed by about 1540-1550. The many international and internal wars of 
the period between 1540 and the Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648), which ended the 
Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), prevented the swift emerging of a new legal order and 
a new law of nations. In fact, this new order – the “Westphalian” system of sovereign 
states – and its law – the modern law of nations or the ius publicum Europaeum – were 
only formed after Westphalia, sometime between 1660 and the Peace of Utrecht (1713). 
As such, the period between 1550 and 1660 was an age of transition from the medieval 
to the modern law of nations.27
Law”, 28 Traditio 483 (1972); idem, “Medieval Canon Law and the Formation of International 
Law”, 81 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kan. Abt. 64 (1995).
26 As David Kennedy has indicated, the early-modern writers of international law (or primitive 
writers, in his terminology) continued to base their argument on the authority of the classical 
texts; David Kennedy, “Primitive Legal Scholarship”, 27 Harvard Int’l L. J. 1, 5-6 (1986). But 
they did so with ever more flexibility in interpreting them, started to become critical about the 
authenticity of their sources (under the influence of humanism), and started to take into account 
in more explicit ways contemporary problems and ideas.
27 I prefer the term modern law of nations to the more frequently used “classical” law of nations 
for the law of nations of the era running from Westphalia to World War I, because it coincides 
with the meaning of “modern” in the sense of general history, the “Modern Age”. On the collapse 
of the medieval system, the period of transition, the significance of Westphalia and the formation 
of the modern law of nations after 1660, see Randall Lesaffer, “The Grotian Tradition Revisited: 
Change and Continuity in the History of International Law”, 73 British Yearbook Int’l L. 103 
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The years around 1600 saw an increasing interest in the law of nations. Writers such 
as Balthazar de Ayala (1548-1584), Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608), and, above all, the 
Dutch humanist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), laid the foundations for an autonomous 
literature and doctrine of the law of nations. They and their immediate successors 
emancipated the law of nations from theology and from the writings of the learned 
law at large, Roman and canon law. While their contribution was far from a creatio ex 
nihilo and while they adopted a lot of the medieval inheritance, new ideas and practices 
crept in. From 1600 onwards, writers would increasingly recognize that apart from the 
doctrinal traditions, they also had to take into account the practices of states and rulers, 
be they historical or contemporary.28 In doing so, they responded to the realities of their 
times. The collapse of the old system of the respublica christiana and the disappearance 
of a common, authoritative doctrine had thrown the sovereigns of Europe back on their 
own devices to find out what the law of nations was, or to create it themselves. Treaties 
and customs were becoming the primary sources of the law of nations.
This does not allow us to regard the doctrinal writings of the Early-Modern Age as 
trustworthy statements of the applicable law of nations. Under the medieval scholastic 
tradition, doctrine was authoritative and idealistic; it was the expression of an almost 
sacred ideal of what the law said or, better, ought to say. This conception of the role of 
the “learned law” outlived the medieval tradition of the ius gentium. Ayala, Gentilis, 
and Grotius all incorporated references to state practice, without however leaving the 
traditional idealistic pretences of doctrine totally aside.
All this one needs to keep in mind when one addresses the question: What was the 
law of nations, or the ius ad bellum, in 1635? International legal historians, when faced 
with such a question, tend to refer to doctrine and limit their research to the writings 
of some of the famous “classics of international law.”29 Doctrine is such convenient 
shorthand that any concern about its relation to the then applicable law is easily passed 
over.30 While this is a dangerous approach for all periods of history, this is particular 
irresponsible for the early seventeenth century. As stated above, the broad consent about 
the old doctrines had dissipated. The many publications on the law of nations that saw 
the light offer, more than anything else, an indication of the abundance and diversity 
of opinions that filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the old certainties. Many of 
(2002); idem, “Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia”, in Peace Treaties and International 
Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One 9 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 
2004). On Westphalia and the formation of the modern law of nations, see Stephane Beaulac, 
The Power of Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin 
and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia (2004).
28 On this process of emancipation during the decades around 1600, see Randall Lesaffer, “An 
Early Treatise on Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman Law and Modern Practice”, 
23 J. Legal History 223, 224-225 (2003).
29 Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law 2-3 (2000).
30 Or, at best, one tries to establish which doctrine was most influential in practice. For an 
example in relation to the ius ad bellum, see Partel Piirimäe, “Just War in Theory and Practice: 
The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War”, 45 The Historical Journal 
499 (2002). 
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these new publications combined old, if amended, doctrinal opinions with descriptions 
and analyses of state practice. As of 1635, there was no common opinion about almost 
any subject in the law of nations. No single work or author had such authority that his 
opinion can be equated with the then applicable law of nations. 
This is as much true for Hugo Grotius and his De Jure Belli ac Pacis libri tres, 
first published in Paris in 1625, as it is for any other author. Grotius certainly was 
wellknown, and had become an authority in France and in some Protestant countries 
by 1635. His major treatise on the law of nations was already widely distributed over 
Europe by 1635.31 There can be no doubt that the drafters of the French declarations 
and manifestos knew Grotius’ book and have taken some of his ideas into account.32 
Grotius had dedicated his book to the King of France and, as the Swedish ambassador 
in France,33 moved in French court circles at the time. But it is certainly not to be as-
sumed that Spanish officials were aware of his work when drafting their declarations. 
In fact, to the Cardinal-Infante Grotius was as good as an unknown quantity in 1635. 
In a letter to his brother Philip IV, dated May 15, 1635, Don Fernando passed on the 
news that Sweden had engaged as its new agent in Paris a certain “Huberto Groncio” 
from Holland, of whom the Cardinal-Infante knew that he was a man of letters the 
Dutch detested because he had sided with Johan of Oldenbarneveldt.34
In order to determine what the law of nations stated on a certain subject in the early 
seventeenth century in particular or in the Early-Modern Era in general, one should 
look both to state practice and to doctrine. For the ius ad bellum, apart from alliance 
treaties, official war declarations and manifestos are the most important and instruc-
tive sources.
This article proposes a case study of the public declarations and manifestos of one 
of the most important wars of the Early-Modern Age. The aim is to clarify what the ius 
ad bellum of the period was. This is not to say that the opinions and practices of two 
powers in one single case necessarily reflect the applicable law – even if it concerns 
the leading powers of the day. Even in a system where treaties and customary law are 
31 According to an often quoted story, the Swedish King Gustav Adolph (1611-1632) had Grotius’ 
treatise under his pillow during his campaigns in the Empire (1630-1632); J.L. de Burigny, Vie de 
Grotius, avec l’Histoire de ses ouvrages, Et des Négociations auxquelles il fut employé 135-136 
(1752). By 1635, the treatise had been published, apart from the first edition from Paris of 1625 
in Frankfurt (1626) and Amsterdam (1631 and 1632); Jacob ter Meulen and P.J.J. Diermanse, 
Bibliographie des ecrits imprimées de Hugo Grotius 227-231 (1950).
32 Grotius was, however, not directly involved in the drafting of the Declaration. On July 2, 1635, 
in a letter to his brother Willem he wrote that he had seen the Declaration of June 6, implying 
that he had read it for the first time; supra note 9, vol. 6, 61.
33 Grotius was officially accepted as Swedish ambassador to the King of France on March 2, 
1635, supra note 9, vol. 6, ix. On Grotius’ role as a diplomat, see C.G. Roelofsen, “Grotius and 
the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century”, in Grotius and International Relations 
95, 121-131 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts eds., 1990).
34 “… de haver llegado a Paris de parte de la corona de Suecia embiado por Oxenstierna Huberto                 
Groncio holandes y persona de buenas letras que desterraron por amigo de Bernavelt”; Brussels, 
General Royal Archive, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 212, 507.
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the dominant source of the law of nations, the actions of the greatest powers may as 
well constitute infringements of the law as they may constitute the law. This being said, 
explicit justifications of war as the ones we encounter here referred to a framework 
of opinions and rules in relation to which the actions of the belligerent were justified 
and of which the authors thought that they were commonly accepted. By consequence, 
justifications of war offer an indication of what powers considered (opinio juris sive 
necessitatis – to use a modern term) acceptable practice (usus) under the law of nations, 
in other words of what they considered to be customary law.
As a case study, the Franco-Spanish war has a lot to say for itself. First, it is one of 
the most important wars of the Early-Modern Age. Second, the belligerents went to 
great lengths in order to justify their actions. Third, the war is well documented. Many 
diplomatic sources have been published by modern scholarship. Even the declarations 
and manifestos have been studied by diplomatic and political historians. Their concern 
was, however, greatly different from the present one in that they were only looking to 
explain the political motives for the war whereas this article will be focussed on the 
legal aspects. But their work has laid the basis for a case study such as this.
At this point, it may be pertinent to warn against a misconstruction of historical 
reality that threatens from the study of current international law. It has been stated and 
repeated that the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928) and the UN Charter (1945) outlawed war 
and laid down a ius contra bellum.35 By opposition, the old ius ad bellum has often been 
perceived to be just that: an absolute right of sovereign states to wage war.36 Whereas 
this approaches reality for the nineteenth century, it becomes a distortion when it is 
applied to the previous three centuries. During the Early-Modern Age, there were rules 
– either of positive or natural law – that laid down restrictive conditions for states to 
resort to warfare. Of course, there was no international institution to enforce these rules 
and sovereigns refused to attach legal consequences to statements about the legality 
or justice of war. War, as well as peace, became non-discriminatory. Regardless of the 
justice or legality of a war, the laws of war were normally applied to all belligerents. 
In peace treaties, the signatories refrained from attributing blame for the war to one 
another. 37 This dominance of might over right was reflected in doctrine.38 But the rules 
35 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 78 (3rd edn, 2001); Michael Howard, 
“Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled?”, in Restraints on War 1, 11 (Michael Howard 
ed., 1979). 
36 Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks 9-10 
(2002).
37 In not one peace treaty between sovereigns of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, 
judgment was rendered on the legality or justice of war; Jörg Fisch, Krieg und Frieden im 
Friedensvertrag. Eine universal-geschichtliche Studie über Grundlagen und Formelemente des        
Friedensschlusses 92-123 (1979); Randall Lesaffer, Europa: Een zoektocht naar vrede? (1453-
1763/1945-1997) 248-257 and 470-475 (1999).
38 The Swiss Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) is often quoted in this respect. But even he did not 
preclude the rendering of a judgment on war between sovereigns completely; Emer de Vattel, 
Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle 3.3.40 (Charles G. Fenwick transl., Carnegie 
1916) (1758). On the transition to a non-discriminatory concept of war, see Fritz Dickmann,            
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on the justice and legality of war as such existed, both in doctrine and in international 
customary law. At least until the end of the eighteenth century, states went a long way 
in justifying their actions in terms of these rules, both in declarations of war and in al-
liance treaties.39 Their use and effects were political and not legal, but their substance 
was at least partially legal.40 The texts of 1928 and 1945 may be revolutionary, but 
they drew on a long tradition. Therefore, the study of the history of the modern ius ad 
bellum can still be of service for understanding where we stand today.
Before the texts of 1635 are studied, some preparatory work must be done. First, 
the political events leading up to the war of 1635 and the political motivations for that 
war are explained (Section 3). Second, the doctrine of the just war as it stood in the 
early seventeenth century is covered (Section 4). This will be of help in discerning 
the legal opinions underlying the declarations of war. Next, the four declarations and 
manifestos are analyzed (Section 5) and the ius ad bellum that underlay these texts is 
explained (Section 6).
III. The Struggle for Hegemony in Europe
The outbreak of the war between France and Spain in 1635 initiated the last phases of 
two other major wars: the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire (1618-1648) and 
the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the rebellious Republic of the United Provinces 
in the Northern Netherlands (1568-1648, with the Twelve Years’ Truce between 1609 
and 1621). The rupture with France dashed any real chance of a Habsburg victory in 
these wars and would ultimately lead to the compromise Peace Treaties of Westphalia 
between the Empire, Sweden, and France (24 October 1648) and the final recognition 
of the Republic by Spain at Münster (30 January 1648). When the Franco-Spanish war 
began, Spain could still claim to be the leading power in Europe. When it ended with 
the Peace Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, Spain had lost that position. France was now 
well placed to make its bit for hegemony in Europe. The wars fought between 1618 and 
1659 also marked the final stages of the crisis of the respublica christiana which had 
begun with the Reformation. The Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and the Pyrenees 
(1659) could not guarantee peace, but gave the great powers of Europe enough stability 
for a new international legal order to emerge in the decades to follow.41
At the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War, Spain was still the leading power in Eu-
rope. The Spanish-Habsburg dynasty not only ruled Spain, Portugal, and the overseas 
Friedensrecht und Friedenssicherung 127-129 (1971); Wilhelm G. Grewe, “Was is klassisches, 
was ist modernes Völkerrecht?”, in Idee und Realität des Rechts in der Entwicklung der inter-
nationaler Beziehungen. Festschrift für Wolfgang Preiser    119 (1983); Otto Kimminich, “Das 
Problem des Friedenssicherung im Völkerrecht des 20. Jahrhunderts”, in  Frieden und Völkerrecht 
298 (G. Picht and I. Eisebart eds., 1973); Carl Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht der 
Jus Publicum Europaeum 25 (1950).
39 In alliance treaties, planned or ongoing wars were almost always justified in terms of defense, 
with some notorious exceptions. Lesaffer, supra note 37, at 216-226 and 443-452.
40 And partially moral. 
41 1 Lesaffer, supra note 27, at 128. 
02 Journal of the History of International Law
territories of these kingdoms in America and Asia, but also Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, 
the Duchy of Milan, and the Spanish Netherlands, including the County of Burgundy 
to the east of France. Since the late 1590s, Spain’s grand strategy had been basically 
defensive, at least in its own eyes. Its primary goal was to keep the empire intact and to 
withstand or prevent any attempt at dismemberment. Spain’s main concern was to defend 
the status quo and its existing hegemony, the Pax Hispanica. As the leading power of 
the day, Spain tended to identify the status quo and the order of Christian Europe, for 
which it considered itself the ultimate guarantor, with its own interest and vice versa. 
Any attempt against that order was likely to be perceived as a threat against Spain.
The dominant maxim of Spain’s foreign policy was that not a single right, not a 
single scrap of land could be given up. First, this would damage the reputation of the 
King. Second, this would trigger more aggression from Spain’s many enemies and 
lead to the collapse of Spain’s empire (the dominotheory). The two most strategic 
and threatened territories of Spain in Europe were the Duchy of Milan in Northern 
Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. Both were military and logistic centers from which 
Spain could intervene in Northern and Central Europe, particularly in the Holy Roman 
Empire. The possession of these territories allowed to threaten Spain’s largest potential 
competitor, France. The weak link was the connection between Milan in Italy and the 
Netherlands: the Spanish Road. This land road through Germany was the lifeline of 
the Spanish empire. Its security was tightly interwoven with the peace and stability of 
the Holy Roman Empire and the security of the Catholic princes of the Empire through 
whose lands it ran. The security of the Spanish Road made it essential that the imperial 
crown was kept safely within the Viennese branch of the Habsburg-family and that the 
Austrian archdukes kept on to their hereditary lands, including their strategic territories 
in the Alps (Tirol) and the Alsace as well as the Kingdom of Bohemia, which guaranteed 
the narrow 4:3 Catholic majority among the electors of the Empire.42
During the larger part of the reign of Philip III (1598-1621), Spain had adopted a 
more defensive posture on the operational level and had sought to steer clear of major 
military adventures.43 The final years of Philip III’s reign saw a shift towards a more 
assertive foreign policy. In 1617, Philip III’s longtime favorite, the Duke of Lerma 
(1552-1624), fell from grace and was replaced by a more hawkish group led by Balthazar 
de Zuñiga (1561-1622). After the latter died in 1622, Gaspar de Guzman, Count-Duke 
of Olivares (1587-1645) and favorite of the new King Philip IV, quickly emerged as 
the new all-powerful valido. These new leaders promoted an interventionist policy in 
Europe, without changing the fundamentally defensive goals of Spain’s grand strategy. 
Zuñiga, Olivares, and their supporters felt that Lerma’s peaceful policies had damaged 
the reputation of the Spanish monarchy and had jeopardized the position of Spain and 
the Casa de Austria, including the Habsburg dynasty that also ruled in Vienna and 
held the imperial crown. 
42 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659) (1972); idem, The 
Thirty Years’ War 34 (2nd edn, 1997).
43 Paul C. Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621 (2000); Bernardo José García 
García, La Pax Hispanica. Política exterior del Duque de Lerma (1996).
Randall Lesaffer 0
When in 1617 trouble stirred up for the Viennese Habsburgs, Zuñiga and his allies 
in Madrid decided to act. The new leaders in Spain realized that the chances for an 
extension of the Twelve Years’ Truce with the Dutch after 1621 were slim and that war 
would soon resume in the Netherlands. Therefore, any attack on Habsburg interests in 
the Empire that could threaten the Spanish Road had to be withstood. In 1617, Madrid 
strengthened the ties with the Austrian Habsburgs and helped secure the imperial crown 
for the militantly Catholic Ferdinand II.44 When the Bohemian rebellion broke loose 
and war between the Viennese Habsburgs and a coalition of Protestant powers erupted, 
Spain intervened. Whereas Spain’s hope was to quickly squash the rebellion and restore 
stability within the Empire so that it could divert its energies to the impending war 
against the Dutch Republic, the war escalated and became a swamp that would suck at 
Spain’s resources for the next thirty years. After the almost complete Habsburg-Catholic 
victory in 1625, the Danish Lutheran King Christian IV (1588-1648) intervened. After 
Christian dropped out of the war (1629), his place was – far more successfully – taken 
by the Swedish Lutheran King Gustav Adolph (1630).
In 1621, war had resumed between Spain and the Republic of the United Provinces. 
Zuñiga and Olivares had no hope for a complete victory and the re-conquest of the 
rebellious provinces. Their goal was an advantageous and lasting peace that would 
provide for the free practice of the Catholic faith in the Republic and stop the Dutch 
attacks on the Spanish and Portuguese interests in America and Asia, two demands 
that had not been met by the expiring Truce of 1609. Throughout the 1620s, Madrid’s 
hope was to beat the Dutch sufficiently to enforce such a peace upon them. But as it 
was felt that the road to military dominance went through Germany, Spain had itself 
increasingly been sucked into the German wars.45
The coming to power of Armand du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu (1587-1642), as 
Prime Minister of France in 1624 marked the reemergence of that country as Spain’s 
main competitor. During the minority of Louis �III (born 1601), France had been 
subjected to internal strife. In 1615 an alliance with Spain was made, whereby both 
Louis �III and the later Philip IV married princesses from the other house. In France, 
there was a strong faction, the dévots, that promoted the alliance with Catholic Spain 
and the internal and external fight against Protestantism over France’s own possible 
aspirations as a great power, which would pit it against Spain.
The first goal of Richelieu’s policy was to strengthen the authority of the King, and, 
through the King, of himself and his friends. He turned against the French Calvinists, 
44 Robert Bireley, Religion and Politics in the Age of the Contrareformation: Emperor Ferdinand 
II, W. Lamormaini and the Formation of Imperial Policy (1981); idem, The Jesuits and the Thirty 
Years War: Kings, Court, and Confessors (2003).
45 On Zuñiga’s and Olivares’ strategy, see Peter J. Brightwell, “The Spanish System and the 
Twelve Years’ Truce”, 89 English Historical Review 270 (1974); idem, “The Spanish Origins 
of the Thirty Years’ War”, 9 European Studies Review 409 (1979); idem, “Spain and Bohemia: 
The Decision to Intervene”, 12 European Studies Review 117 (1982); John H. Elliott, The Count-
Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline 55-84 (1986); Eberhard Straub, Pax et 
Imperium. Spaniens Kampf um seinen Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635           11, 
19-28, and 109-129 (1980).
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the Huguenots, thereby keeping to his old, dévot policies. But he also proposed a more 
assertive foreign policy. From the very beginning of his time in office, Richelieu set 
France on a collision course with Spain. He direly needed foreign policy successes 
in order to justify his strong-armed policies at home. But he also developed a very 
consistent foreign strategy for its own sake.46
Richelieu did not perceive Spain’s strategy to be merely defensive. He argued that 
Spain sought the domination of the whole of Christianity: universal monarchy, or 
monarchia universalis.47 Spain’s current position was such that it threatened the liberty 
and sovereignty of all European princes, especially those of Germany and Italy. Fur-
thermore, the territories of Spain and its Austrian allies encircled France and prevented 
it from intervening in Italy or Germany, since more than a century the battle grounds 
of Europe. Throughout his long term in office (1624-1642), Richelieu consistently 
defined France’s vital interests in the same terms: breaking the encirclement of France 
by the Habsburgs through gaining strategic footholds in Germany and Italy that allowed 
France better to defend itself, to intervene military in those countries and, in one and 
the same movement, to cut the Spanish Road if so wished.48 This did not translate in 
outright expansionism, but in a flexible policy that used various means – from pushing 
dynastic claims over alliance treaties to war – in order to gain effective control – not 
necessarily involving sovereignty – over a few strategic fortresses at the Alpine passes 
and on the Rhine.49
The first major clash between France and Spain came when the death of the last 
Duke from the house of Gonzaga, late 1627, triggered a succession crisis in Mantua. A 
French nobleman took power. Spain, however, could not condone that one of the most 
strategic fortresses of Northern Italy, Casale, would thus fall into the hands of a French 
ally and decided to act. Casale was besieged. In reaction, Louis �III led an army into 
46 David Parrott, “The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635”, in The Origins of War in 
Early Modern Europe 72, 85-88 (Jeremy Black ed., 1987).
47 Franz Bosbach, “Die Habsburger und die Entstehung des Drei�igjährigen Krieges. Die �           Mo-
narchia Universalis’”, in Krieg und Politik 1618-1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven    
151 (Konrad Repgen ed., 1988).
48 Richelieu himself consistently defined the French foreign policy and war aims as such. 
Compare his famous advice to King Louis �III of January 13, 1629 in Avenel, supra note 2, 
vol. 3, 179-213, with the “Instruction pour Messieurs les Ambassadeurs des France, envoyéez à 
Cologne pour le Traitté de Paix générale (1637)”, in Acta Pacis Westphalicae Serie I Instruktionen 
1 Frankreich, Schweden, Kaiser 38-58 (Fritz Dickmann et al. eds., 1962) or “Die Ausfertigung 
der Hauptinstruktion für Münster (1643)”, in ibidem 58-123.
49 The traditional views on Richelieu’s dream of giving France natural borders (e.g. the Rhine) 
and therefore pursuing a blatantly expansionist policy is now far and wide rejected. On the old   
views, see P.E. Hübinger, “Die Anfänge der französischen Rheinpolitik als historisches Problem”, 
171 Historische Zeitschrift 21 (1951). Good statements of the new assessment of Richelieu’s        
foreign policy can be found in William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (1972); John 
H. Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares 86-172 (1984); Hermann Weber, “Richelieu et le Rhin”, 249 
Revue Historique 265 (1968); idem, Frankreich, Kurtrier, der Rhein und das Reich, 1623-1635 
59-68 (1969).
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Italy (February 1629). In 1630, the imperial army descended upon Mantua and gave 
Spain the military advantage. But in the summer of that same year, Ferdinand II turned 
the tables and opted for a compromise peace that left the Spanish empty-handed (Peace 
of Cherasco, 1631).50 Through silent and treacherous diplomatic maneuvering, France 
gained the fortress of Pinerolo from the Duke of Savoy and thereby secured itself a 
strategic entrance into Italy.
The French-Spanish collision over Mantua did not lead to an all-out war yet. But 
it sent home the message to both Olivares and Richelieu that, in the long term, war 
was unavoidable. Richelieu wanted to postpone if not prevent such a war because he 
realized that France and his regime were not ready for it. But from 1630 onwards, 
Richelieu intensified his struggle against the Spanish monarchy by waging a true “war 
by proxy.” This was done by giving diplomatic and financial support to all Spain’s en-
emies, including the Dutch, the Swedes, and the German Protestant princes. Richelieu 
also tried to stir up trouble for the Habsburgs by seeking favor with the princes of Italy 
and the members of the Catholic League within the Empire, chiefly among them the 
Elector of Bavaria Maximilian (1591-1651), all of them allies of the Emperor. Olivares 
rightly blamed France for much of the difficulties Spain met in Italy, Germany, and 
the Netherlands. As the years went by, he came to consider Richelieu’s France as the 
most important stumbling block for his main strategic goal: the restoration of the Pax 
Hispanica through a stable and advantageous peace in the Empire and, ultimately, in 
the Netherlands. Realization dawned upon the Count-Duke that sooner or later the 
Cardinal-Minister and his regime would have to be taken out of the equation. Maybe, 
the road to peace ran through Paris after all. While neither of both great statesmen had 
decided upon war by the early 1630s, both at least started to consider it in terms of 
contingency planning.51
The early 1630s were overshadowed by the military successes of the Swedes in 
Germany. After his landing at Peenemünde in 1630, the Swedish King Gustav Adolph 
quickly scored some major victories. The lands of the main members of the Catholic 
League such as Mainz, Cologne, Trier, and Bavaria were occupied or threatened, 
while an army invaded Bohemia and struck at Vienna itself.52 The Habsburg position 
50 The first Peace Treaty of Regensburg of October 13, 1630 between the Emperor and France 
was subsequently rejected by Louis XIII and never ratified; D.P. O’Connell, “A Cause Célèbre 
in the History of Treaty-Making: The Refusal to Ratify the Peace Treaty of Regensburg in 1630”, 
42 British Yearbook Int’l L. 71 (1967). See for these events, John H. Elliott, “Spain and the War”, 
in The Thirty Years’ War 92 (Geoffrey Parker, 1997); idem, supra note 45, at 337-346. Toby 
Osborne, Dynasty and Diplomacy in the Court of Savoy: Political Culture and the Thirty Years’ 
War 143-192 (2002).
51 Elliott, supra note 45, 359-408. Richard A. Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain: A 
Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720 103 (1981).
52 Ronald G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648 
101-107 (1997); Georges Pagès, La guerre de trente ans 1618-1648 117-150 (1972); 2 Parker, 
supra note 42, 108-119; Michael Roberts, Gustavus-Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611-1632 
vol. 2 (1958); C.V. Wegdwood, The Thirty Years War 269-334 (1938).
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in North-West Europe also deteriorated as the Dutch, for the first time since 1621, had 
gone on the offensive in the war against Spain as of 1629.53
Richelieu grabbed the opportunity to strengthen the French positions at the eastern 
borders. Once again, he tried to break the Catholic League loose from the Emperor and 
form a third, neutral party in the Empire. He used the leverage the Swedish threat gave 
him, offering the Catholic princes French protection against the Swedes in exchange for 
their neutrality. Of the more important princes, only the Archbishop-Elector of Trier, 
Philip von Sötern (1623-1652), accepted at first (April 9, 1632). He gave the French 
the right to garrison several strategic places in the Archbishopric such as Trier on the 
Moesel, Ehrenbreitstein on the Rhine and Philippsburg, also situated on the Rhine in 
Sötern’s Bishopric of Speyer.54 In order to take the town of Trier, the French had to 
drive out the Spanish garrison that was there on the invitation of the burghers of the 
town, who had asked for protection against their own prince. Later, in September 1633, 
the Archbishop-Elector of Cologne followed suit and allowed French garrisons into 
his towns. Meanwhile, the French overran the Duchy of Lorraine and forced Duke 
Charles IV (1624-1675), an ally of the Emperor, to cede his lands temporarily and to 
allow them to be garrisoned by the French (1631-1634). Louis �III and Richelieu also 
gained some places in Alsace along the Upper-Rhine.55
By the winter of 1632-1633, Spain and its allies were in dire straits. The war in 
the Netherlands had turned disastrous. The towns of ’s Hertogenbosch (1629) and 
Maastricht (1632) had been lost while rebellion threatened in the Spanish Netherlands 
(1632-1633). Richelieu’s “war by proxy” seemed on the verge of success. At that point, 
Olivares decided to mobilize all the energies of the monarchy to mount a new offensive 
against Spain’s enemies. The cornerstone of this endeavor was the decision to send 
King Philip’s youngest brother, the Cardinal-Infante, with an army through the Empire 
to open up the Spanish Road, take over the government of the Spanish Netherlands, 
and reinvigorate the Spanish military operations in the North. On his way through the 
Empire, on September 6, 1634, the Cardinal-Infante scored a major victory together 
with his brother in law, the Emperor’s son Ferdinand (later Ferdinand III, 1637-1657) 
against the Swedish army at Nördlingen. Instead of capitalizing upon that victory and 
further push back the Swedes, Don Fernando continued his journey to the Spanish 
Netherlands, where he arrived in November 1634.56
53 David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642 101-102 
(2001).
54 Treaty of Ehrenbreitstein of April 9, 1632, in Du Mont, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 29. The 
Swedes, however, had already taken Philippsburg and only gave it up at the end of 1634.
55 Louis Batifol, “Richelieu et la question d’Alsace”, 138        Revue Historique 161 (1921); Bertold 
Baustaedt, Richelieu und Deutschland. Von der Slacht bei Breitenfeld bis zum Tode Bernhards         
von Weimar (1936); Joseph Baur, Philipp von Sötern, geistlicher Kurfürst von Trier, und seine 
Politik während der dreißigjährigen Krieges vol. 1, 203-374 (1897); Georges Fagniez, “Le Père 
Joseph et Richelieu”, 36-38 Revue Historique (1888-1890); Wilhelm Mommsen, Richelieu, Elsaß 
und Lothringen (1922); Weber, supra note 49, 108-321.
56 Alfred Van der Essen, Le Cardinal-Infant et la politique européenne de l’Espagne 1609-1641 
(1944).
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In recent years, historians have quarreled about the question whether Madrid had 
by that time decided upon a war against France and was planning to invade France 
in 1634 or 1635. Richard Stradling has argued that an offensive against France was 
surely in the making. In his view, Spain only did not start the war of 1635 itself because 
France forestalled it. Indeed, in 1634 and 1635 plans to invade France circulated and 
naval preparations were made. In its session of April 13, 1634 the Council of State in 
Madrid had decided that time was not yet ripe for a declaration of war against France 
and that it was better to let events unfold themselves.57 At the meetings of the Council of 
State of January 14 and 16, 1635 and of March 3, 1635, however, Olivares was clearly 
entertaining thoughts about a rupture with France and discussed the preparation for 
an invasion of France.58 In April 1635, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, Cristobal de 
Benavente, was recalled.59 In 1636, after the Cardinal-Infante had repulsed the Franco-
Dutch invasion of 1635, he invaded France. Also, after the Battle of Nördlingen, the 
Spanish intensified their attempts to secure an offensive and defensive alliance with 
Vienna against the Republic and France.60 Stradling also implied that Olivares had 
planned an offensive war against France ever since the Mantuan debacle and gave it 
strategic priority over an offensive against the Dutch.61 Though Stradling shrinks from 
taking this final step, from there to the claim that Spain after all wanted to strengthen 
its hand in a great-power war that would give it monarchia universalis would be a 
small step. Jonathan Israel took offense at Stradling’s analysis. He defends the view 
that Spain, even after the opening of the hostilities with France, kept granting an of-
fensive against the Republic priority and opted for a defensive military posture against 
France, at least in the Netherlands. The invasion of France by the Cardinal-Infante of 
1636 was a one-time event, an opportunistic move that was only decided upon after 
the planned attack on the Republic was aborted for that year and ultimately triggered 
by the possibilities it gave for joint action with the imperial army.62 
These opposing views are less irreconcilable than they seem. In general, politicians’ 
actions are less consistent than scholars’ generalizations need them to be. The truth 
57 Elliott, supra note 45, at 472; Parrott, supra note 53, at 106.
58 Simancas, General Archive, Estado No. 2049 and No. 2050, 3 and 32. See Richard A. Stradling, 
“Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-Spanish War of 1627-1635”, 101 English Historical 
Review 68, 90-93 (1986).
59 Stradling, supra note 58, at 93.
60 Heinrich Günter,  Die Habsburger-Liga 1625-1635. Briefe und Akten aus dem General-Archiv 
zu Simancas 178-90 (1908); Randall Lesaffer, “Het einde van de Spaanse hegemonie in Europa. 
De kardinaal-infant en het Spaans-Oostenrijks ‘familiepact’ (1633-1637)”, 74 Revue Belge de 
Philologie et d’Histoire 317, 333-337 (1996).
61 Stradling, supra note 58, at 78-80. Parrott sides with him, though with more nuance; supra 
note 46, at 92.
62 Jonathan Israel, “Olivares, the Cardinal-Infante and Spain’s Strategy in the Low Countries 
(1635-1643): The Road to Rocroi”, in Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour 
of John H. Elliott 267 (Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker eds., 1995). See also Jonathan 
Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606-1661 254-255 (1982).
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of the matter is that Stradling concentrates on the decision-making in Madrid, while 
Israel also takes into account the position of the Cardinal-Infante and his advisers in 
Brussels. Behind all this lurks a discrepancy between the level of strategic planning on 
a European scale and the level of operational planning for the distinct military theaters. 
Stradling is right in as far as he claims that Olivares thought a war against France to 
be probable if not unavoidable ever since the Mantuan crisis and that he incorporated 
this possibility into his plans. During 1634, he also made plans for an offensive against 
France.63 He seemed to be convinced by then that it would be necessary to take France 
out of the equation to make victory against the Dutch possible. A quick and devastating 
attack on France followed by a peace treaty would accomplish this.64 On the level of the 
Spanish strategy war planning, France came to the fore as a main concern of Olivares 
as the 1630s progressed. But that does not mean that the same was true on the level of 
the operational planning for the Netherlands. Nor does it imply that, even on a Euro-
pean scale, the plan for an attack against France was prepared concretely and seriously 
enough or had sufficiently progressed by the winter of 1634-1635 for the invasion to 
materialize any time soon.65 The evidence Israel brought in is quite convincing to the 
point that, on the operational level of the Netherlands, Olivares did not give priority to 
an attack against France over the operations against the Republic.66 But the Count-Duke 
was not consistent in this either. Olivares was opportunistic and volatile in his decisions 
at the operational level. When the Spanish scored a major, unexpected success against 
the Republic with the capture of the fortress of Schenk at the end of 1635, his hopes 
for a successful offensive against the Republic for 1636 soared. Once the fortress was 
recaptured in the early days of the 1636 campaigning season and the Cardinal-Infante 
decided to invade France in concordance with the imperial army, Olivares agreed. The 
Cardinal-Infante, as Israel indicated, showed a similar flexibility, but was more driven 
by the realities on the ground than the armchair military planner Olivares.67 Finally, 
Israel is right to stress the continuity in Olivares’ main strategic goal: an advantageous 
peace with the Republic. War and a subsequent peace with France were a means to that 
end, and not the other way around. 
In short, Israel is right that the war with France did not change Olivares’ main goal 
– securing peace with the Hague – and did not dominate the operational planning and 
decision-making for the Netherlands. Stradling for his part is right that during the years 
1634 and 1635 Olivares took into account the possibility of an attack on France and 
63 Madrid understood that the Emperor would not declare war upon either France or the Republic 
before he had made his peace with the main German Protestant princes, such as the Electors of 
Saxony and Brandenburg. This was finally done at the Peace of Prague of May 30, 1635. The 
Emperor would only start campaigning against France in 1636.
64 This view is shared by Elliott, supra note 45, at 457-519.
65 During the meeting of the Spanish Council of State of March 5, 1635, at which Olivares talked 
about war with France, he also proposed military actions against Maastricht, Grave, or Venlo in 
the Northern Netherlands. Simancas, General Archive, Estado No. 2050, 32.
66 Israel, supra note 62, at 272-280.
67 Elliott, supra note 45, at 492-495 and 504-505.
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even had plans drawn up. But they were not pursued sufficiently for them to materialize 
in time and no actual decision to attack France was made.
The crucial question for our purposes, viz. whether Spain would have invaded France 
if France had not moved first, cannot be answered with certainty. But to indulge for 
a brief moment in the conjectures of counter-factual history, my hunch is that Spain 
would in any case have made its decision to declare war and start an offensive against 
France dependent upon the Emperor and would thus have waited one or more years.68 
The Cardinal-Infante for his part did not plan an invasion of France in 1635. Before 
the French invasion of May of that year, Don Fernando had only issued orders for his 
troops to march towards Trier to prevent the French from joining up with the Dutch.69 
But whatever the answer to this question might be and however offensive the actions 
of Olivares might have become, the goal of Spain’s grand strategy had not changed. 
Spain did not aspire to any French territory nor did it seriously expect to reconquer the 
Northern Netherlands. As ever, the Spanish war aims were peace and the restoration of 
the status quo ante, in other words, of its hegemony, the Pax Hispanica.
The French decision to declare war upon Spain and invade the Spanish Nether-
lands in May 1635 is easier to understand. The victory of the two Habsburg princes 
at Nördlingen changed the balance of power in the German theater. All of a sudden, 
Richelieu had reason to fear that his greatest nightmare would become true: that his 
allies would make their peace with the Emperor and Spain and that France would be 
left alone to face the wrath of the Casa de Austria. For years, France’s Protestant allies 
had implored Paris to break openly with the Spanish. France had always evaded this. 
Even in 1634, when news reached Paris of an offensive alliance between Spain and 
Louis �III’s rebellious brother and heir, Duke Gaston of Orléans (1608-1660),70 did 
Richelieu still resist the pressure for an open war.71 
After Nördlingen, this was no longer a possibility. In November 1634, the Lutheran 
Elector of Saxony signed a preliminary peace agreement with the Emperor. The Re-
public and Sweden increased the pressure on France to enter the war. As the imperial 
68 For the circumstantial evidence for this, see Lesaffer, supra note 59, 333-51 and footnotes 
there; also Randall Lesaffer, Defensor Pacis Hispanicae. De kardinaal-infant, de Zuidelijke    
Nederlanden en de Europese politiek van Spanje: van Nördlingen tot Breda (1634-1637) 87-
116 and 141-163 (1994). See also René Vermeir, In staat van oorlog. Filips IV en de Zuidelijke 
Nederlanden, 1629-1648, 126-127 (2001).
69 Letter of the Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV of May 15, 1635, in Correspondance de la Cour 
d’Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle vol. 3, 54 (Hubert Lonchay, Joseph 
Cuvelier, and Joseph Lefèvre eds., 1930).
70 Treaty of Brussels of May 12, 1634.
71 The King himself at some point promoted war, see “Lettre du Roy à Son Eminence sur le 
sujet de l’ouverture de la guerre” of 4 August 1634, in supra note 48, at 17-20. In a memoir 
from June 1634, Richelieu had strongly pleaded against a war. Paris, Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Correspondance Politique Hollande No. 16, 464. See Hermann Weber, “Vom 
verdeckten zum offenen Krieg. Richelieus Kriegsgründe und Kriegsziele 1634/1635”, in Krieg 
und Politik 1618-1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven    203, 204-210 (Konrad Repgen 
ed., 1988).
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armies rolled back the Swedish and approached the French positions on the Rhine, the 
fear for a Habsburg invasion grew.72 Whereas Richelieu still stalled on a final deci-
sion in his negotiations with the Swedish, he concluded an offensive league with the 
Republic on February 8, 1635.73 Thereby the parties agreed that they would jointly 
invade the Spanish Netherlands that year. The allies agreed to call upon the population 
to rise against the Spanish and liberate themselves. If this transpired, then the Spanish 
Netherlands would become a sovereign and Catholic federation. If not, then their lands 
would be carved up by France and the Republic.74 Nevertheless, the Treaty included 
an escape clause. The Preamble made the Treaty conditional upon the fact that the 
Spanish would continue to refuse a reasonable accommodation.75 Richelieu also sent 
diplomats to Italy in order to form an offensive alliance against Spain with as many 
Italian states as possible and start a war there. This met with partial success.76 To ward 
off disaster on the eastern borders of France, in late 1634 the French had sent an army 
into the Lower Palatinate and thus became involved in the war in the Empire against 
the Emperor – though a state of war was not openly recognized.77
Meanwhile, the Habsburgs continued to strengthen their positions in the West of the 
Empire. On January 24, 1635, imperial troops captured the fortress of Philippsburg. On 
February 2, they drove the French garrisons out of the Bishopric Speyer. Two months 
later, on March 26, 1635, the Spanish, knowing of the French-Dutch invasion plans, 
took an ominous step. On that day, a Spanish corps took the town of Trier by surprise, 
thereby killing some two hundred French soldiers and capturing another six hundred. 
They also secured the Archbishop-Elector Philip von Sötern and abducted him to the 
Spanish Netherlands.78 Louis �III and Richelieu now decided to act and declare war.79 
On April 21, 1635, the French resident diplomat Gabriel d’Amontot was instructed to 
demand the release of the Elector from the Cardinal-Infante and threaten with war.80 
A week later, Louis �III and Richelieu hastily secured their alliance with the Swedish 
72 Parrott, supra note 53, at 108.
73 A year before, Richelieu had still refused Dutch proposals for an offensive alliance; Fagniez, 
supra note 55, vol. 2, 206-207; Israel, supra note 62, at 303-304; Parrott, supra note 53, at 
106.
74 Treaty published in Du Mont, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 80. See Jean de Pange,    Charnacé et 
l’alliance franco-hollandaise (1633-1637) 114-127 (1905).
75 “… if the Spanish do not accept reasonable terms for an accommodation,” Preamble (my 
transl.), in Du Mont, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 80.
76 Baustaedt, supra note 55, 132-3; Auguste Leman, Urbain VIII et la rivalité de la France avec 
la maison d’Autriche de 1631 à 1635 462-465 (1949); Weber, supra note 71, at 210.
77 Parrott, supra note 53, at 108.
78 Letter of Richard Pauli Stravius to Cardinal Francesco Barberini of March 31, 1635, supra 
note 2, at 56-57, Vermeir, supra note 68, at 114.
79 Already on March 31, 1635. See Weber, supra note 17, at 92-93.
80 Avenel, supra note 2, vol. 4, 762.
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at Compiègne.81 Meanwhile, the Spanish ambassador in France left Paris quietly.82 
After the Cardinal-Infante’s reply of May 4, 1635 had reached them,83 Louis �III and 
Richelieu instructed Jean Gratiollet to go and declare war, invoking the capture of Trier 
and its sovereign as the casus belli.
An eventual final decision by Olivares to invade was forestalled by France’s ac-
tion. Richelieu took that action, although he was even less assured of success and the 
readiness of his country than Olivares already wasn’t. But the Battle of Nördlingen 
had turned France’s war by proxy on itself, and after the Cardinal-Infante’s bold move 
against Trier, Richelieu must have felt that he was running out of options. Turning 
down his main protégé in this hour of need was simply not one of the few remaining 
options if further defections from the anti-Habsburg alliance were to be prevented. But 
all the preparations, plans, and diplomatic maneuvers of the winter of 1634-1635 did 
not impede the protagonists to continue to search each other out for peace until the last 
moment.84 For a long time, war had been expected, prepared, and even planned for; 
but above all, it had been dreaded.
IV. Just and Legitimate Wars in Early-Modern Doctrine
The medieval just war doctrine
To the Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas (1224/1225-1274) falls the merit of 
having laid down the classical formula of the just war doctrine. According to Aquinas, 
for a war to be just three conditions had to be fulfilled. First, a war had to be waged 
under the authority of a prince (auctoritas principis). War was distinct from acts of 
violence between private persons, who had to seek redress for injuries suffered through 
the courts of their prince. The same went for subordinate rulers and bodies politic. By 
the days of Aquinas, it had become widely established that war was the privilege of 
those princes who did not recognize a higher authority (superiorem non recognoscens) 
– apart from the higher authority of the Pope and maybe the Emperor, that is.85 Second, 
81 Treaty of Compiègne of April 28, 1635, in Du Mont, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 88.
82 Letter of Grotius to Manasse de Pas, Marquis of Feuquières of May 9, 1635, supra note 9, 
vol. 5, 454-455. That move was already suggested by Olivares on March 5, 1635; see Simancas, 
General Archive, Estado No. 2050, 32.
83 The Cardinal-Infante stalled by saying that he awaited instructions from the Elector’s suzerain, 
the Emperor. See for his other efforts at evasion, Letter of Stravius to Barberini, May 5, 1635, 
supra note 2, at 63.
84 Leman, supra note 76, at 510-515. See also Mémoire du Comte Duc de Olivares au Roi 
Philippe 4 con occasion del rompimiento de Franceses en Flandes (August 1634), Simancas, 
General Archive, No. K. 1644, 9. In fact, Richelieu and Olivares would continue to seek each          
other out throughout the war; see Auguste Leman, Richelieu et Olivarès. Leurs Négociations  
secrètes de 1636 à 1642 pour le retablissement de la paix (1938).
85 Other scholars, like Cardinal Hostiensis (ca. 1200-1271), stuck to the view that only the su-
preme sovereigns, the Pope and Emperor, could wage war or authorize it; Summa Aurea Liber 
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a war had to be waged for a just cause (causa iusta). Aquinas indicated the avenging 
or punishing of a wrong suffered at the hands of the enemy and the restoring of what 
had been unjustly seized as the main causes of war. More generally, under medieval 
doctrine, war was just if it was a reaction to a wrong suffered at the hands of an enemy, 
whether it was defensive or offensive on an operational level. It served as an instrument 
of law enforcement, as a substitute for judicial trial, as a kind of trial by battle. By and 
large medieval doctrine did not touch much upon the issue of self-defense as a just 
cause for war because it was considered the exercise of a natural right of each man, 
and not only of princes. Moreover, to many theologians, it was considered somewhat 
morally deficient as it was self-serving. Finally, doctrine also distinguished actions in 
the exercise of the natural right of self-defense from actual war. Actions in self-defense 
did not trigger the full application of the iura belli – the rights of war – such as the right 
to make booty and conquests. The natural right of self-defense was also limited in that 
resort to force had to stop once the attack was warded off. An actual war, could go on, 
however, after the attack was stopped in order to inflict punishment on the enemy.86 
Third, the belligerent needed to be of a righteous intention (recta intentio). This referred 
to his moral disposition. The goal of the war had to be something morally good, such 
as the establishing of a firm and just peace. 
To many of the scholastic scholars of the Late Middle Ages, a war could only be 
just on one side. As the justice of the cause and the righteousness of the intention of the 
belligerent could be held to the light of a common and authoritative body of law (the 
ius commune of Roman and canon law) and morality (Christian moral theology), the 
truth about the claims of the belligerents could be established objectively. Doing this 
was the realm of the ecclesiastical courts and, above all, the Pope. According to Roman 
lawyers, only the belligerents that were waging a war in accordance with the ius ad 
bellum enjoyed the benefits of the application of the ius in bello, the laws regulating the 
conduct of war, such as the right to appropriate the lands and property of the enemy.87 
Several civilians, among whom the great commentator Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1314-
1357), however, mitigated the consequences of this discriminatory concept of war. For 
a belligerent to qualify as a hostis whose right to wage war was recognized and thus to 
enjoy the iura belli, it sufficed that he was sovereign and that war had been formally 
declared. As there was no higher authority to judge on the claims of superiorem non 
recognoscentes, each had to judge the justice of his claims for himself.88
I, rubr. De treuga et pace.
86 Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History 59-61 (2005); Frederick H. 
Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages 161-162 and 270-273 (1975).
87 On the basis of D. 49.15.24; Haggenmacher, supra note 24, at 280-288; Theodor Meron, 
Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the Later Middle 
Ages 40-41 (1993). In reality, the ius in bello was by and large applied indiscriminately between 
sovereign belligerents, and even often between sovereigns and their vassals.
88 On the medieval just war doctrine, see Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force 
by States 6-8 (1963); Grewe, supra note 29, at 105-113; Haggenmacher, supra note 24, at 23-42, 
53-223, and 280-288 (1983); Georges Hubrecht, “La juste guerre dans la doctrine chrétienne, 
des origines au milieu du �VIe siècle”, 15 Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin pour l’histoire 
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Neo-scholasticism and humanism
To the early-modern writers of the law of nations, the just war was of great concern.89 The 
collapse of the medieval order and the erosion of the authority of the papal courts and 
the medieval theological and juridical doctrines jeopardized the traditional conceptions. 
What Bartolus had already touched upon now became a problem of insurmountable 
proportions. In the absence of any higher or neutral authority to rule on the justice and 
morality of a belligerent’s claims and intentions and of any common moral and legal 
framework, how could the justice of this or that belligerent be established? And if 
both parties stuck to their positions and stated to be the sole just belligerent and thus 
the sole to benefit from the ius in bello, how could the application of that ius in bello 
be guaranteed? The issue was also intensified by the problems raised in relation to the 
non-Christian and non-Roman peoples of the New World. How could the old, medi-
eval rules based on Roman and canon law as well as Christian theology be applied to 
those peoples? 90
Modern scholarship has classified the forefathers of the modern law of nations of 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, sometimes referred to as the “precursors 
of Grotius,”91 in two broad categories: the neo-scholastic writers such as the Spanish 
theologians of the School of Salamanca, who continued the tradition of medieval, 
scholastic theology, and the writers who were, to a greater or a lesser extent, influenced 
comparative du droit et des institutions 107 (1961); James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason 
and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740 (1975); Maurice H. Keen, 
The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages 63-185 (1965); Neff, supra note 86, at 49-82; Robert 
Regout, La doctrine de la guerre juste, de Saint Augustin à nos jours d’après les théologiens et 
les canonistes catholiques (1935); Russell, supra note 86; Joachim von Elbe, “The Evolution of 
the Concept of Just War in International Law”, 33 AJIL 665, 669-673 (1939); Karl-Heinz Ziegler, 
“Kriegsrechtliche Literatur im Spätmittelalter”, in Der Krieg im Mittelalter und in der frühen 
Neuzeit. Gründe, Begründungen, Bilder, Bräuche, Recht     57 (Heinrich Brunner ed., 1999).
89 On early-modern doctrine relating to the just war, see Michael Behnen, “Der gerechte und der               
notwendige Krieg. ‘Necessitas’ und ‘utilitas publica’ in der Kriegstheorie der 16. und 17. Jahr-           
hundert”, in Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen Geschichte der frühen 
Neuzeit 43 (Johannes Kunisch ed., 1986); Fritz Dickmann, “Krieg und Frieden im Völkerrecht 
der frühen Neuzeit”, in Friedensrecht und Friedenssicherung. Studien zum Friedensproblem in    
der Geschichte 116 (1971); Joachim Engel, “Von der spätmittelalterlichen res publica christiana 
bis zum Mächte-Europa der Neuzeit”, in Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte vol. 3, 307 
(1971); Haggenmacher, supra note 24; Johnson, supra note 88; Kimminich, supra note 38; 
Regout, supra note 88, at 51-278; Ernst Reibstein, Völkerrecht. Eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in 
Lehre und Praxis vol. 1, 237-481 (1958); Von Elbe, supra note 88, at 673-680.
90 On the significance of the discoveries for the development of the modern law of nations, see 
Antony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law”, 5 Social 
and Legal Studies 321 (1996); Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colo-
nialism and Order in World Politics (2002); Karl-Heinz Ziegler, “Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der 
Eroberung Lateinamerikas”, 23 Zeitschrift der Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 1 (2001).
91 Ernest Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius (1882); Carl von Kaltenborn, 
Die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius auf dem Gebiete des Jus Naturae et Gentium (1848).
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by humanism.92 Whereas most international legal historians have stressed the novel 
contributions of the authors of both schools to the just war doctrine, one has to keep in 
mind that their writings, including those of Grotius, stood in a dialectic relation to the 
traditions of the past. Confronted with the collapse of the old and with the challenge 
of new realities, they fought a downhill battle, but one in retreat. But apart from some 
exceptions – e.g. Ayala – and whatever the outcome, their endeavors were inspired 
by the desire to save what they could from the old doctrines by adapting them to the 
new realities.
Francisco de Vitoria
First among the neo-scholastic thinkers of the period was the Dominican Francisco de 
Vitoria (ca. 1480-1546). Vitoria’s first concern was the justice of the Spanish conquest 
of the Indian lands in the Americas.93 Vitoria restated Aquinas’ doctrine of the just 
92 Recently, Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International 
Order from Grotius to Kant 1-77 (1999). In my view, one can further distinguish among this 
last group between a purely humanistic approach and a more political or pragmatic approach. 
Among the pure humanists, I rate authors such as Desiderius Erasmus (ca. 1469-1536) and 
the jurist Andreas Alciatus (ca. 1490-1550). The humanists paved the way for the political or 
pragmatic tendency. The authors of this latter group took the new realities of the emerging state 
and the emancipation of politics and law from Christian ethics to its consequences by focusing 
on state sovereignty and the interests of the state – reason of state – as the guiding principle of 
international relations and its law. I count Balthazar de Ayala and Albericus Gentilis belonging 
to this group. 1 Lesaffer, supra note 27, 121-122 (2002). On the contribution of some “pure” 
humanists, see José Antonio Fernandez-Santamaria, “Erasmus on the Just War”, 34 Journal of 
the History of Ideas 209 (1973); idem, The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in 
the Renaissance, 1516-1559 (1977).
93 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de iure belli, Introduction, English translation in Francisco 
de Vitoria, Political Writings 295 (Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991). For a 
recent edition of the Latin text (with German translation), see Francisco de Vitoria, Vorlesungen 
II. Völkerrecht, Politik, Kirche 542 (Ulrich Horst, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, and Joachim 
Stüben eds., Kohlhammer 1997). On Vitoria’s doctrine, see Camilo Barcia Trelles, “Francisco        
de Vitoria et l’école moderne du droit international”, 17 Recueil des Cours 111, 242-333 (1927); 
Fernandez-Santamaria, supra note 92, at 131-141; Jörg Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und 
das Völkerrecht. Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Status der überseeischen Gebiete vom 15.          
Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart 212-223 (1984); Grewe, supra note 29, at 204-207; Alejandro 
Herrero y Rubio, Derecho de Gentes. Introducción Historica  43-63 (1995); Kennedy, supra 
note 26, at 32-35; Heinz Kipp, Moderne Probleme des Kriegsrecht in der Spätscholastik. eine 
rechtsphilosophische Studie über die Voraussetzungen des Rechtes zum Kriege bei Vitoria and 
Suarez (1935); James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vi-
toria and his Law of Nations 195-241 (1934); Antonio Truyol y Serra, “La conception de la paix 
chez Vitoria et les classiques espagnols du droit des gens”, 15 Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin 
pour l’histoire comparative du droit et des institutions 241 (1961); Joe Verhoeven, “Vitoria ou 
la matrice du droit international”, in Actualité de la pensée juridique de Francisco de Vitoria 
97, 112-117 (1988); Ziegler, supra note 90, at 5-15.
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war, but also nuanced it to such an extent that much of it became irrelevant. Whereas, 
objectively speaking, a war could only be just on one side, Vitoria acquiesced to the 
fact that war could be just on both sides from a subjective point of view. A sovereign 
prince who on the basis of an “invincible ignorance” was convinced of the justice of 
his cause and acted in good faith, could be excused from the guilt of waging an unjust 
war. A war between two sovereigns who were convinced of their cause, was to be 
considered a war between two just belligerents.94 
As for the causes of a just war, Vitoria clung to Aquinas’ view that war was only 
justified as a reaction against a wrong suffered.95 Among the just causes, Vitoria named 
war on account of tyrannical oppression of subjects by their own “barbarian masters” 
and war in the defense of the innocent victims of two particular sins against nature: 
human sacrifice and cannibalism.96 A right of intervention existed to protect those who 
had converted to Christianity and were afterwards forced to forswear their new faith.97 
Vitoria’s ideas about the just war on both sides were adapted by most of the later Spanish 
neo-scholastics.98 They offered a way out of the dilemma caused by the collapse of the 
old authorities without having to abandon the general outlines of traditional doctrine. 
But for all practical purposes, they went a long way towards reducing the old doctrine 
to its first condition: a war waged by a sovereign who took the trouble of justifying his 
actions through a plausible claim had to be considered a just one.
Balthazar de Ayala
On the Spanish side, Balthazar de Ayala (1548-1584) has to be mentioned, especially 
since he lived and worked in the Spanish Netherlands. His notoriety was not limited to 
94 Vitoria, supra note 93, 2.4.32.
95 Vitoria, supra note 93, 1.3.13. Vitoria also considered self-defense a natural right belonging 
to each individual. He defined it as a “response to immediate danger, made in the heat of the 
moment”. It did not include punitive action after the attack had ceased, as a just war did, 1.2.4-
5.
96 Vitoria, Relectio de Indis 3.15, English translation in Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings 
233, 287-288 (Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991). For a recent edition of the 
Latin text (with German translation), see Francisco de Vitoria, Vorlesungen II. Völkerrecht, Po- 
litik, Kirche 370 (Ulrich Horst, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, and Joachim Stüben eds., 1997).
97 Vitoria, supra note 93, 3.13. On the ideas of Vitoria, as well as Ayala, Gentilis, and Grotius 
about intervention, see G.P. van Nifterik, “Religious and Humanitarian Intervention in Six-
teenth- and Early Seventeenth-Century Legal Thought”, in Sovereignty and the Law of Nations 
(16th-18th Centuries) (Randall Lesaffer and Georges Macours eds., forthcoming 2006).
98 Grewe, supra note 29, at 206. The Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), another leading rep-
resentative of the Spanish neo-scholastics, rejected the notion of a war that is just on both sides. 
But he went to great lengths to attribute the benefits of the ius in bello to the soldiers fighting on 
the “wrong” side; Kennedy, supra note 26, at 54-56; Luciano Pereña Vicente, Teoria della guerra 
en Francisco Suarez vol. 1, 119-315 (1954); Josef Soder, Francisco Suarez und das Völkerrecht 
248-307 (1973).
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the Spanish world; Grotius himself referred to him.99 Ayala studied law at the Leuven 
law faculty. As an auditor in the Spanish army in the Netherlands, he was above all a 
practitioner and a pragmatist. Among the authors discussed, his ideas were the least 
influenced by traditional doctrine and were the most innovative. For Ayala, war was the 
privilege of sovereigns. And because they were sovereigns, nobody could judge on the 
justice of their actions. Ayala enumerated the just causes of war, but he attached no legal 
consequences to such matters.100 They belonged solely to the domain of moral justice 
– that is, binding on someone’s conscience – but not of “complete”– that is, externally 
binding – law. Ayala was the first author of the Early-Modern Age to distinguish between 
the justice and the legality of war. For a war to be legal and the laws of war to apply, 
it sufficed that it was, first, waged by a sovereign and, second, formally declared.101 If 
these conditions were fulfilled, it was legal and the laws of war applied.102 By conse-
quence, all wars formally declared between sovereigns were lawful on all sides.103 One 
of Ayala’s main concerns was to reject the legitimacy of the Dutch rebellion against 
the Spanish monarchy. Because rebels were no sovereigns and because rebellion itself 
was unlawful, a rebellion could never be considered a war and rebels could hold no 
claim to be treated as hostes and enjoy the benefits of the ius in bello. They had to be 
treated on a par with pirates and robbers.104 More generally, Ayala rejected any form of 
intervention by a ruler on behalf of another ruler’s subjects. In the Christian world, it 
fell to the Pope to act against a tyrannical ruler and, if necessary, to depose him.105
99 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri III, Prolegomena 38 (Francis W. Kelsey transl., 
Carnegie 1925) (the text is that of the 1646 edition. It was originally published in Paris in 1625. 
I used this edition for the Latin text).
100 He enumerated the defense of oneself, one’s allies, and property, the revindication of property 
and the avenging of a wrong; Balthasar de Ayala, De Jure et Officiis bellicis et Disciplina Militari 
libri III 1.2.11 (John Pawley Bate transl., Carnegie 1912) (1582). On Ayala, see Manuel Fraga     
Iribarne, “Baltasar de Ayala”, 1 Revista Espa�ola de Derecho Internacional 125 (1948); Grewe, 
supra note 29, at 207-209; W.S.M. Knight, “Balthasar Ayala and His Work”, 3rd Series 3 Jour-
nal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 220 (1921); Jaime Peralta, Balthasar de 
Ayala y el derecho de la guerra (1964); Hans-Jürgen Wolff, Kriegserklärung und Kriegszustand 
nach klassischem Völkerrecht mit einem Beitrag zu den Gründen für eine Gleichbehandlung 
Kriegführender 181-188 (1990).
101 Ayala, supra note 100, 1.2.34. Ayala referred extensively to the procedure of declaring war 
by the Roman fetials according to Livy; Ayala, supra note 100, 1.1; Livy 1.32.6.
102 Meron, supra note 87, at 42-43.
103 Ayala, supra note 100, 1.2.34-5.
104 Ayala, supra note 100, 1.2.12-15.
105 Ayala, supra note 100, 1.2.27.
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Albericus Gentilis
On the Protestant side, Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
were the two foremost authors. It is certain that Grotius’ work was known in French gov-
ernment circles by 1635, and Grotius acknowledged his indebtedness to Gentilis.106
Gentilis was a Protestant of Italian origin who had fled his homeland and had found 
a new home in England. He became Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford (1587). 
He was definitely influenced by humanism.107 Like his immediate predecessors and 
contemporaries, Gentilis paid lip service to the traditional just war doctrine, but adapted 
it to the realities of his day.108 According to the Italian jurist, all defensive wars waged by 
sovereigns were just, whether fought in defense of themselves, their subjects, or allies 
and friends.109 Among offensive wars, he made a distinction between wars avenging a 
wrong and wars waged to enforce a juridical claim. Not only did he follow Vitoria to the 
point that a war could be just on both sides subjectively speaking, but he also found that 
it could be just on both sides objectively speaking. In the absence of a higher judicial 
authority, sovereigns enjoyed a legal right to wage war in order to enforce a disputed 
claim, even if this claim proved to be unjust. In this sense, a war over the enforcement 
of a disputed claim had to be likened to a civil trial. As in a civil trial procedural law 
granted both parties the right to bring their case to court, so the law of nations granted 
all sovereigns the right to fight over their claims. Gentilis acknowledged that nothing 
guaranteed the victory of the party who had the stronger claim, but that could not be 
helped.110 For the state of war to be legal and the ius in bello to apply, a formal declara-
tion of war was necessary, except in cases of self-defense against an ongoing attack. In 
Gentilis’ view, the declaration served as an ultimate attempt to prevent war. The party 
who declared war had to observe a period of thirty-three days between the rendering 
of the declaration and the opening of the hostilities.111 
106 Grotius, supra note 99, Prolegomena 38.
107 Tuck, supra note 92, at 16-50.
108 Albericus Gentilis,  De Iure Belli libri tres 1. 2-3, 5, 7   and 12 (John Rolfe transl., Carnegie 
1933) (This is the 1612 edition. The work was first published in separate parts during the years 
1588-1589, and then again in one volume in 1598). On Gentilis, see Peter Haggenmacher, “Gro-
tius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture”, in Grotius and 
International Relations 133 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts eds., 1990); 
idem, “Il diritto della guerra et della pace di Gentili. Considerazioni sparse di un Groziano”, in      Il 
diritto della guerra e della pace di Alberico Gentili. Atti del convegno, quarta giornata Gentil-     
iana 21 Settembre 1991 7 (1995); Thomas Erskine Holland, “Alberico Gentili”, in idem, Studies 
in International Law 1 (1898); Kennedy, supra note 26, at 65-74; Theodor Meron, “Common 
Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suárez”, 85 AJIL 110 (1991); G.H.J. van der Molen, 
Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law (1968).
109 Gentilis considered the defense of oneself, one’s property, and subjects a natural cause for 
war (and for private violence); Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.13.
110 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.6.
111 Gentilis, supra note 108, 2.1.217-218 and 2.2.218-219.
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Furthermore, Gentilis made some interesting points concerning defensive warfare 
on behalf of others. Referring to the great Stoic tradition of Cicero and Seneca, which 
had been revived by the humanists, Gentilis recognized that all mankind was bound 
together through “kinship, love, kindness and a bond of fellowship.”112 From this, he 
derived a moral obligation to render aid to other peoples, if one could do so without 
prejudice to oneself. This obligation was not limited to princes and peoples with whom 
one had a treaty of alliance, but extended to peoples of the same “race and blood,” and 
certainly the same religion.113 
Contrary to Ayala, Gentilis held the opinion that if a rebellion was sufficiently 
widespread, it could be considered a war. The rebels took on the characteristics of a 
public body politic and thus gained the right to wage war.114 If the rebels had a just 
cause, their war was a just war. Such belligerents could then be lawfully assisted by 
other princes against their own (former) sovereigns. More generally, princes had the 
right to intervene to protect foreign subjects if those were treated unjustly by their 
sovereigns.115 This allowed one, under certain circumstances, even to assist rebels in 
a cause that was not just. 
Gentilis touched upon the question of preventive defense. Whereas self-defense 
properly speaking was referred to as “necessary defence” (necessaria defensio), this 
was referred to as “defence by expediency” (utilis defensio). Gentilis allowed for 
anticipatory defense, which he defined as making “war through fear that we may 
ourselves be attacked”.116 By this he meant anticipatory action against dangers “that 
are already meditated and prepared,” or what we could almost compare to our current 
notion of preemptive defense. “Preventive action,” to use present-day terminology, 
against “probable and possible dangers” was also justifiable. He explicitly referred to 
the danger that Europe would fall under the domination of Spain. But the danger of a 
state becoming too powerful, a “probable and possible danger,” made a war not just 
by itself. Only if another just cause could be invoked, would war be just.117 Finally, as 
regards offensive war, Gentilis allowed for interventions in order to punish those who 
committed grave violations of the laws of nature and of mankind such as cannibalism 
or atheism. He vested this right in the common responsibility of all sovereign, public 
authorities for mankind and human nature.118
112 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.15.107 (transl. vol. 2, 67).
113 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.15.116-117.
114 He supported the English intervention of 1585 on behalf of the Dutch Republic; Gentilis, 
supra note 108, 1.16.127.
115 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.16.120-122.
116 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.14.96 (transl. vol. 2, 61).
117 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.14.104-7; Tuck did not mention this last nuance in his exposition 
on Gentilis and preventive war, Tuck, supra note 92, at 18-31.
118 Gentilis, supra note 108, 1.25.
Randall Lesaffer 
Hugo Grotius
The strength of Grotius’ seminal De jure belli ac pacis of 1625 does not lie in its clarity 
or consistency. Its merit is that it offers the most comprehensive synthesis of the law 
of nations of the early seventeenth century. As such, it became a work of reference for 
generations to come. But Grotius’ work was eclectic as it drew from various intellectual 
backgrounds, including neo-scholasticism and humanism.119 Although Grotius may have 
been an innovative author on some points, whose ideas have withstood the test of times 
and certainly helped form the modern law of nations, he did not radically break with 
the old, medieval intellectual traditions. This and the tendency of the humanist erudite 
to quote extensively from an abundance of historical and literary sources make up for 
the fact that Grotius’ thought is often unclear, unsystematic, and, at times, paradoxical 
or outright contradictory. After all, it is these paradoxes and contradictions that allow 
scholars to grant Grotius at one and the same time both the title of father of the modern 
law of nations, based upon an almost absolute concept of state sovereignty,120 and of 
the “post-modern” international law of the twentieth century, which sought to limit 
that same sovereignty.121
Like his “precursors”, Grotius sought to reconcile tradition with the new reality of 
the emerging sovereign state and the collapse of the old caused by religious warfare 
and the discovery of a new world. The elasticity of his thought was facilitated by his 
distinguishing two kinds of law of nations: the natural law of nations (ius gentium 
naturale or primarium), which was derived from natural law, and the volitional law of 
nations (ius gentium voluntarium or secundarium), which was man made and found its 
basis in human will.122 The latter category was, of course, to be found in treaties and 
customs, but it could also be based on the general consent of the peoples. The natural 
law of nations was binding in foro interno, upon conscience, and the voluntary law 
of nations was binding in foro externo¸ in the external legal order. To Grotius and his 
119 Since the late nineteenth century, Grotius’ dependency on the neo-scholastic writers has been 
stressed. More recently, Tuck rightly vindicated the humanist influence on Grotius’ work; Tuck, 
supra note 92, at 78-79.
120 For the discussion about Grotius’ “fatherhood” of the modern law of nations, see Maurice 
Bourquin, “Grotius est-il le père du droit des gens?”, in Grandes figures et grandes oeuvres ju-
ridiques 77 (1948); Wilhelm G. Grewe, “Grotius – Vater des Völkerrechts?”, 23 Der Staat 161 
(1984); Karl-Heinz Ziegler, “Hugo Grotius als Vater des Völkerrechts”, in Gedächtnisschrift für 
Wolfgang Martens 851 (Peter Selmer and Ingo von Münch eds., 1987).
121 Grewe, supra note 29, at 193-194 and 214-215; 1 Lesaffer, supra note 27, at 108-109. Early 
defenders of the “Grotian tradition” in twentieth-century international law include Maurice Bour-
quin, “Grotius et les tendances actuelles du droit international”, 7 Journal de droit international 
et de législation comparée 85 (1926); Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International 
Law”, 23 British Year Book Int’l L. 1 (1946); Cornelius Van Vollenhoven, The Three Stages in 
the Evolution of the Law of Nations (1919).
122 As Hersch Lauterpacht already remarked, Grotius did not construe a system of law, but 
explained what different bodies of law had to say; Lauterpacht, supra note 121, at 5. This is 
actually true for many humanist writers who were often more concerned with showing off their 
erudition than with building a comprehensible doctrine; Kennedy, supra note 26.
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predecessors, the binding on the conscience meant more than the cynical international 
lawyers of the twenty-first century are likely to think. Natural law was still the law that 
mattered. Natural justice and morality remained closely associated to religion, which 
continued to weigh heavily on the decisions of princes, to the extent that it constituted 
one of the major issues in international relations. Moreover, throughout the early sev-
enteenth century, princes often made the most important decisions after consulting their 
confessors or a council of theologians.123 The ultimate basis for the binding character 
of the volitional law of nations was the natural law principle of pacta sunt servanda.124 
In Grotius’ view, the volitional law of nations could never contradict natural law. Its 
purpose was only to clarify or specify natural law. After all, the binding force of the 
volitional law rested upon the law of nature and its inherent justice and rationality.125
In his De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius developed two doctrines on war, without clearly 
and consistently separating and distinguishing them: one pertaining to the domain of 
natural law and one pertaining to volitional law.126 In the realm of natural law, the Dutch 
humanist abided by the Thomist tradition of the just war. The just causes for war were 
the traditional ones: defense, including that of subjects, allies, and friends, revindica-
tion of property, and punishment of a wrong suffered.127 In more general terms, Grotius 
stated that war could only be undertaken “for the enforcement of rights.”128 War was 
thus rejected as an instrument for change. Grotius adopted Vitoria’s views on invincible 
ignorance and the war being just on both sides.129 Wars fought for a just cause were 
just if they were fought for one’s own sake or for the sake of another. The defense of 
123 On Olivares, Philip IV, Ferdinand II, see in this respect Bireley, supra note 44 (2x); Elliott, 
supra note 49, at 97-99 and 126-127; Richard A. Stradling, Philip IV and the Government of 
Spain, 1621-1665 (1988); Straub, supra note 45, at 79-108.
124 Grotius, supra note 99, Prolegomena 15, 17 and 1.1.9-14. See H. van Eikema Hommes,     
“Grotius on Natural and International Law”, 30 Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 61 (1983); Hartmut 
Schiedermair, “Hugo Grotius und die Naturrechtsschule”, in Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit. 
Festschrift für Karl Carstens vol. 1, 477 (Bodo Börner, Hermann Jahrrei�, and Klaus Stern eds.,     
1985); Hans Wehberg, “Die Unterschiedung von Natur- und Völkerrecht in der Lehre von H. 
Grotius”, in Mensch und Staat in Recht und Geschichte, Festschrift H. Kraus 227 (1954).
125 Kennedy, supra note 26, at 82-83.
126 The best expositions of Grotius’ thought on the laws of war can be found in G.I.A.D. Draper, 
“Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal Ideas about War”, in Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations 177 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts eds., 1990); Haggenmacher, 
supra note 24; A Normative Approach to War: Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius (Yasuaka 
Onuma ed., 1993); Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius (1965); Tuck, supra 
note 92, at 78-108.
127 “Authorities generally assign to wars three justifiable causes, defence, recovery of property, 
and punishment”; Grotius, supra note 99, 2.1.2.2 (transl. vol. 2, 171).
128 Grotius, supra note 99, Prolegomena 25 (transl. vol. 2, 18).
129 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.23.13.
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subjects, allies, friends, and all people with whom one had a bond of kinship was as 
laudable, if not more, than self-defense.130 
Grotius’ ideas about the justice of intervention were inspired by those of Gentilis 
and, to a lesser extent, Vitoria. He discussed the problem in terms of natural, and not 
volitional law. Much like Vitoria and Gentilis, Grotius indicated the sovereign rulers 
of the world as the defenders and upholders of natural rights, be it for their own or for 
foreign subjects.131 He accepted the right of intervention to punish acts against the law of 
nature and to protect innocent people from those acts. Among other things, he expressly 
referred to acts of cruelty committed against Christians because of their religion.132
In line with medieval doctrine and his immediate predecessors, Grotius considered 
self-defense, whether against a just or an unjust attack, a natural right. It pertained to 
both individuals and states, whereas war did only to the latter. The use of force by private 
persons Grotius referred to as private wars, as opposed to public wars by princes and 
republics. An action in self-defense did not amount to actual war. It only allowed for 
limited – proportional – violence to ward off the attack and should end once the attack 
had stopped. From this, Grotius distinguished a defensive war. Defensive war was the 
prerogative of princes and republics. It was a war justified by the causa iusta defense, 
whether this was self-defense or the defense of property, subjects or allies. The concept 
of defense as a just cause was more extended. Defensive war encompassed preventive 
action. According to Grotius, fear of the might of a neighbor was insufficient as a cause 
for war unless the – aggressive – intentions of that neighbor were certain.133 Such a war 
was justified because of its necessity, not because of the justice of its cause. Defense 
was only just if it was directed against an unjust attack. As a natural right, self-defense 
was also allowed against a just attack.134 
In Grotius’ system, just like in medieval doctrine and with the other early modern 
writers of the law of nations, self-defense had a double function. On the one hand it was 
a natural right which gave rise to a right to use force that was limited both in relation 
to its goal and duration, and to is legal consequences. On the other hand, it could serve 
as a just cause for war. Like their medieval predecessors, most early-modern writers 
hardly commented upon it in relation to the just war, but none of them would deny that 
it was a just cause. Defense was predominantly discussed in terms of defense of third 
persons, or of preventive defense.
In the realm of the volitional law of nations, Grotius only spoke of the legality of 
law. Next to the just war (bellum iustum), Grotius thus introduced the notion of formal 
war (bellum solenne). For a war to be legal, it had to be waged by a sovereign and had 
130 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.25.1 and 4-6.
131 Grotius’ doctrine of intervention derived more from the humanist tradition than the neo-
scholastic tradition; Tuck, supra note 92, at 94-108.
132 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.1.16, and 2.20.40 and 49.
133 It should be noted that Franciscus Zypaeus (1578/79-1650), a jurist from the Spanish Nether-
lands in the service of the Bishop of Antwerp, roughly agreed with this point of view; Franciscus 
Zypaeus, Iudex, magistratus, Senator libris IV exhibitus 4.7.7, 149-150 (1633).
134 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.1, esp. 2.1.2 and 2.1.16-17; and 2.22.5; Neff, supra note 86, at 126-
130.
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to be formally declared. In claiming this, Grotius adhered to both Ayala’s and Gentilis’ 
views. In a war formally declared and fought between sovereigns, all belligerents were 
protected by the laws of war and could reap the benefits of the state of war, such as mak-
ing booty.135 The declaration served to prove that it was a war between sovereigns.136
But still, the two kinds of war were not completely separated. Even in a formal war, 
the justice of the war was not irrelevant. For Grotius it was of great consequence in 
relation to third parties. The justice of a war did not only apply to the belligerent who 
had just cause, but also to those assisting him.137 Allies who were under an obligation 
by treaty to assist both sides should waive those obligations as regards the belligerent(s) 
fighting an unjust war.138 Those who were neutral (in bello medii) were only allowed to 
assist those waging a just war and were prohibited to hinder the same.139 Grotius also 
claimed that subjects who thought a war to be unjust were excused from serving in 
that war.140 In stating these claims, Grotius correctly assessed that justifications of the 
causes of war were usually of a propagandistic nature towards subjects, vassals, and 
third powers, but that they were important for that reason.141 The legal consequences 
he attributed to these were devoid of much reality, but Grotius was right to reflect the 
significance material justifications had in political reality with a place in his system 
of the law of nations. 
Regardless of the justice or the legality of a war, Grotius strongly recommended 
sovereigns not to wage war except if it was really necessary or only for the “most 
weighty cause at a most opportune time.”142 Hereby, he introduced the purposes of the 
war into the discussion, not in moral terms – like “intention” in the classical just war 
doctrine – but in terms of expediency.
The early “classics of international law” up to Grotius did much to adapt the just war 
doctrine to the realities of a world where the sovereign princes were truly that, as there 
was no higher authority or even common, authoritative legal and moral framework to 
govern their actions. To guarantee that belligerents would treat one another according 
135 Grotius, supra note 99, 1.3.4.1, 3.3.4-5, and 3.3.12. On principle, a delay had to be respected; 
3.3.13. See also Meron, supra note 87, at 51.
136 Grotius, supra note 99, 3.3.11.
137 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.25.1.1.
138 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.15.13.
139 Grotius, supra note 99, 3.17. On neutrality in early-modern doctrine, see Stephen Neff, The 
Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History 10-43 (2000).
140 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.26.3.
141 This was also a purpose of formal declaration: “Declarations of war in fact, as we shall shortly 
be saying, were wont to be made publicly, with a statement of the cause, in order that the whole 
human race as it were might judge of the justness of it”; Grotius, supra note 99, 2.26.4.7 (transl. 
vol. 2, 593).
142 Grotius, supra note 99, 2.24.8-9 (transl. vol. 2, 575); see also the rest of Chapter 2.24. A prince 
also had to weigh the evil and the good that could come from the war. This was a traditional 
demand in the just war doctrine. Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force 
by States 35 (2004).
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to the laws of war, the writers from the various traditions went a long way towards 
designing a concept of “legal” war that was devoid of much material substance in terms 
of causes and goals, and was almost purely formalistic. The distinction between the 
(moral) justice and the (formal) legality of war was a step towards the emancipation 
of the law of nations from theology and the ius commune where Christian morality, 
natural law, and positive law formed an inextricable amalgam. But the distinction did 
not yet turn into an absolute rejection of the moral, natural law discourse. From Vitoria 
to Grotius, all writers of the early modern law of nations stubbornly refused to give 
up the old doctrine of the “just” war and all recognized the significance of the moral-
political justification of war. Grotius for his part even tried to recuperate it in the sphere 
of positive law. His attempt was unsuccessful and purely theoretical, but in doing so 
he succeeded in indicating the significance of material justifications: the audiences for 
the benefit of whom they were made.
(Part II concluding this article is to appear in the next issue)
